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ABSTRACT
In this Article we discuss how U.S. entity law has evolved in recent
decades so that (i) limited liability has become available to the owners of
any form of business organization, and (ii) all forms of business
organizations are now seen as having the status of entities separate from
their owners. Those changes have occurred without significant
consideration of their consequences or what they mean for the public
policies underlying entity law. At the same time, there is an increasing
awareness by businesses that promotion of social benefits and/or reduction
of externalities is in the firm’s best interests. There has recently been
development of hybrid business models, but they have been driven by
pragmatic concerns rather than an understanding of the theoretical
underpinnings for, and restrictions on, those models. This Article strives
to point the way toward a new understanding of how the state should frame
the requirements for limited liability and separate entity status.
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INTRODUCTION
The principal characteristic that traditionally distinguished a
business corporation from any other form of entity organized under state
law was the limited liability provided to its shareholders. Section 6.22(b)
of the Model Business Corporation Act states, “a shareholder of a
corporation is not personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation
except that he may become personally liable by reason of his own acts or
conduct.”1 Until the enactment of the first limited liability company statute
in Wyoming in 1977,2 no other form of entity that could be created under
state law provided equivalent liability protection for every owner of an
entity.
While limited liability has obvious value to the shareholders by
giving them the comfort of knowing they have at risk only what they have
chosen to invest in the corporation, it also has an obvious detriment for
those dealing with the corporation because they are limited to looking only
to the corporation’s assets for amounts they may be owed. The benefits
and detriments of limited liability have led commentators to take opposite
sides of the question whether limited liability is socially beneficial and
should be retained. We survey that debate briefly in Part I.
Related to the corporate characteristic of limited liability was the
status of a corporation as a separate entity distinct from its owners. The
burden for that separateness was an extra layer of taxation, and the benefit
was the right to act as a separate person.3 Those characteristics were in
stark contrast to the way business forms that were not corporations were
seen—as aggregates of their owners, passing through income and risk to
the individuals,4 rather than as separate entities. But, as with limited
liability, the uniqueness of corporations as separate entities has now all but
disappeared.
Regardless of whether there are valid policy arguments on the side
of those who argue for limiting or eliminating limited liability,
developments in the law of business entities over the last few decades have
*
Mr. Clark and Ms. Hickok are partners with Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, Philadelphia, PA. Mr.
Clark is the author of the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation discussed in Part IV.
1. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.22(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 2010).
2. Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 158, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 537 (enacted Mar.
4, 1977) (codified at WYO. STAT. §§ 17-29-101 to -1105).
3. “C corporations are separately taxable entities under the IRC. Thus, C corporation earnings
are subject to double taxation–first at the corporate level and again at the shareholder level upon
distribution of dividends.” Byron F. Egan, Choice of Entity Alternatives, 39 TEX. J. BUS. L. 379, 415
(2004). See also Christopher Beam, Why Do We Tax Corporations?, SLATE (Oct. 17, 2008, 6:02 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2008/10/why_do_we_tax_corporations.
html [https://perma.cc/DVY2-FY4G].
4. Thomas Earl Geu, Understanding the Limited Liability Company: A Basic Comparative
Primer (Part Two), 37 S.D. L. REV. 467, 469–72, 489 (1992).
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resulted in pervasive limited liability and, along with that, characterization
of all types of business organizations as entities. In Part II we review
briefly how limited liability and separate entity status have become the
norm for all forms of business entities created under state law.
Almost completely missing, however, from the legislative initiatives
that have led to the triumph of limited liability and separate entity status is
any consideration of whether these changes have been accompanied by a
proper allocation of benefits and burdens between the state and the
now-pervasive limited liability/separate identity entities. Originally,
corporations compensated the state for at least part of the cost of the
externalities created by the corporations through their liability as separate
taxpayers.5 The spread of limited liability and separate identity has been
accompanied by changes in tax law,6 which means that essentially all
privately owned businesses have the ability to organize in such a way that
they are exempt from taxation as a separate entity, thus leaving the state
to shoulder the responsibility for community building and reduction in
externalities.7 In Part III, we begin with a discussion of the debate between
two competing legal theories of the corporation and whether that debate
remains relevant. We then move to a broader discussion of the basis on
which society should require responsible behavior from businesses as the
price of limited liability and separate identity. We close in Part IV by
offering the benefit corporation form as a better way of understanding how
society should expect business to be conducted.
I. IS LIMITED LIABILITY SOCIALLY BENEFICIAL?
The debate about whether limited liability is socially beneficial has
been going on for a long time. As early as 1911, Nicholas Murray Butler,
the President of Columbia University, said, “I weigh my words when I say
that in my judgment the limited liability corporation is the greatest single
discovery of modern times. . . . Even steam and electricity are far less
important than the limited liability corporation, and they would be reduced
to comparative impotence without it.”8 More recently, Henry Manne
argued that limited liability is critical to the widespread use of the publicly
held corporation because it assures investors that they are not placing their
5. Beam, supra note 3. For a brief discussion of the corporate tax and shareholder tax see also,
Egan, supra note 3, at 415–16.
6. William J. Rands, Passthrough Entities and Their Unprincipled Differences Under Federal
Tax Law, 49 SMU L. REV. 15, 17–18, 19 n.9 (1995).
7. See generally Susan Pace Hamill, The Origins Behind the Limited Liability Company, 59 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1459, 1460 (1998); Egan, supra note 3.
8. Roger E. Meiners, James S. Mofsky & Robert D. Tollison, Piercing the Veil of Limited
Liability, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 351, 351 (1979) (alteration in original) (quoting WILLIAM MEADE
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 21 (1917)).
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personal assets at risk when they buy a share in a corporation.9 And,
Richard Posner argued that limited liability facilitated credit transactions
and that, absent limited liability, “the supply of investment and the demand
for credit might be much smaller than they are.”10 Both Manne and Posner
noted that under the rule of limited liability involuntary creditors might
suffer, but they found the benefits of the rule outweighed the undesirable
situation of tort creditors.11 Roger Meiners, James Mofsky, and Robert
Tollison subsequently questioned whether Manne and Posner were correct
and argued that limited liability does not reduce transaction costs for
investors and also does not impose unwarranted costs on involuntary
creditors.12
On the other side of the issue are scholars who continue to argue that
the availability of limited liability should be eliminated, or at least
regulated, if it proves too difficult to place effective limits on its
availability. A fairly recent example of those who would restrict limited
liability are Stephanie Blankenburg and Dan Plesch, who wrote in 2007:
Limited liability is at the heart of this rise of corporate power: it
constitutes a blanket exemption of a special-interest group from
accountability for the actions of their companies. While the mantra
of “no rights without responsibilities” is used to regulate the behavior
of poor people who benefit from social-security payments, “the
unaccountable few” enjoy feudal privileges. Owner-shareholders
(and by extension manager-directors) are beyond the law to an extent
not enjoyed by the central committees of communist parties, similar
to the despotic monarchies, dictators and tribal leaders over which
liberal western societies claim moral superiority, and akin to the
aristocracy in the ancient regimes of pre-enlightenment Europe.
Adam Smith, the brilliant economist and guru of free-marketeers,
was also a staunch opponent of limited liability. In 1776, he wrote:
“To establish a joint stock company [shareholding corporation],
however, for any undertaking, merely because such a company might
be capable of managing it successfully; or to exempt a particular set
of dealers from some of the general laws which take place with
regard to all their neighbours, merely because they might be capable
of thriving if they had such an exemption, would certainly not be
reasonable.” Smith’s objection – carefully omitted from the praise
9. See Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV.
259, 262–63 (1967).
10. Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REV.
499, 503 (1976).
11. See Manne, supra note 9, at 263; Posner, supra note 10, at 519–24.
12. Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison, supra note 8, at 351.
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heaped on him by free-marketeers with no worries about corporate
power – makes a simple but powerful point: a democratic and free
society should not exempt some people from general laws simply
because their business may thrive as a result.
If equality before the law is to have any meaning, it must apply to
human beings, not fictitious persons, and organisations must not be
handed blanket exemptions from accountability simply on the
grounds that they can thrive through privilege. We cannot, on the one
hand, treat corporations as if they were just any person, and on the
other, invest them with unequal protection. Otherwise, we are guilty
of a double blindness to power: disregarding it by setting human
beings equal to powerful corporations before the law, and
disregarding it again by granting special-interest protection to the
powerful through limited liability.13

Additionally, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel have argued that
the court-fashioned remedy of piercing the corporate veil strikes a balance
between the benefits of limited liability and excessive risk taking.14 But,
veil piercing is only close to being an effective remedy in the context of
closely held corporations.15
Although interesting from the theoretical perspective of what is the
best public policy, the debate about the desirability of limited liability has
become largely irrelevant as a practical matter because of the spread of
limited liability that we discuss in the next section.
II. THE TRIUMPH OF LIMITED LIABILITY
A. The Spread of Limited Liability in Recent Decades
In the last few decades, there has been a pronounced movement away
from restricting limited liability to corporations, and limited liability is
now available for every type of business entity. Consistent with the
aggregate theory of partnership, which sees a general partnership as a
collection of individuals doing business together, the partners in a general

13. Stephanie Blankenburg & Dan Plesch, Corporate Rights and Responsibilities: Restoring
Legal Accountability, OPENDEMOCRACY (May 9, 2007) (first alteration in original) (emphasis added),
https://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-institutions_government/corporate_responsibilities_
4605.jsp [https://perma.cc/NG8K-FTG8]. For a scholarly explication of the authors’ views, see
Stephanie Blankenburg, Dan Plesch & Frank Wilkinson, Limited Liability and the Modern
Corporation in Theory and in Practice, 34 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 821 (2010).
14. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 89, 93 (1985).
15. Robert B. Thompson, The Limits of Liability in the New Limited Liability Entities, 32 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1, 9 (1997) (“Piercing occurs only within corporate groups or in close corporations
with fewer than ten shareholders.”).
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partnership were personally liable for its obligations.16 Section 15 of the
Uniform Partnership Act (1914), which made all of the partners in a
general partnership personally liable for all of its debts and obligations,
was the unquestioned rule in the U.S. for close to eighty years.17 But, the
rise of limited liability partnerships in the 1990s18 made a profound change
in the nature of a general partnership.
When limited liability partnerships were first authorized by the
states, they provided only a partial liability shield for the partners: the
partners were not personally liable for torts they were not involved in, but
they remained liable for the non-tort obligations of the partnership.19In
1997, the Uniform Partnership Act was amended to provide a full shield
for partners in a general partnership.
The change to a full shield followed a trend that had already begun
in some states. Most states have now adopted the full shield approach
introduced in the 1997 revision of the Uniform Partnership Act20 and it is
to be expected that the remaining states will follow suit in the next few
years. As a result, a general partnership—in which the general partners
remain personally liable for its debts and obligations—is becoming a
rarity21 and usually reflects a situation in which the partners have sought
counsel on this issue or are not concerned about their personal liability
because of the nature of the partnership’s business.
Traditionally, limited partnerships provided partial, but not
complete, liability protection for the partners. The general partners
remained personally liable and subject to the same rules as applied to
partners in a general partnership.22 Limited partners were given a liability
shield, but it did not apply to liabilities to a third party who reasonably
believed while dealing with the partnership that a limited partner was a
general partner.23 Both of those limitations on limited liability have now
been removed. The liability shield for limited partners is now absolute in
the Uniform Limited Partnership Act,24 and limited partnerships are now
16. Nature of Partner’s Liability, UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 15 (1914).
17. See id.; see also Hamill, supra note 7.
18. See Kern Alexander, Lessons from the Rise of the US Limited Liability Partnership:
Regulating Risk-taking in the Large Professional Firm, 6–7 (ESRC Ctr. for Bus. Res., Univ. of
Cambridge, Working Paper No. 255, 2010); Hamill, supra note 7.
19. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-306 (1999).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT (1985); General Partner’s Liability, UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT
§ 404 (2013).
23. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 303.
24. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 306 (2001) (amended 2013); UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 303 (2001)
(amended 2013) (“An obligation of a limited partnership, whether arising in contract, tort, or
otherwise, is not the obligation of a limited partner. A limited partner is not personally liable, directly
or indirectly, by way of contribution or otherwise, for an obligation of the limited partnership solely
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able to elect to be limited liability limited partnerships which has the effect
of giving the general partner(s) a liability shield.25
Ever since their first invention in 1977, limited liability companies
have provided that the owners of the company, known as “members,” were
entitled to the same liability shield as shareholders in a corporation.26
All forms of partnerships have also been redefined as entities.27 The
rejection of the aggregate theory of partnerships was the subject of debate
for many years.28 But when the aggregate theory was rejected, the change
came very quickly and with little detailed explanation. The
recommendation that led to the change came from a committee of the
ABA Business Law Section. In a report issued in 1987, that committee
concluded—in largely conclusory fashion and with virtually no analysis—
as follows:
Because the “entity theory” avoids a number of technical problems,
such as the authority of a general partnership to sue or be sued in its
partnership name, the subcommittee determined that it should be
incorporated into any revision of the UPA whenever possible and that
the “aggregate theory” should be retained only where it appears to be
essential, e.g., because of tax considerations.29

Today, limited liability and separate entity status are taken so much
for granted as a part of entity law that they have even been extended to
unincorporated nonprofit associations, which are the effective equivalent

by reason of being a limited partner, even if the limited partner participates in the management and
control of the limited partnership.”).
25. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(c) (1997) (amended 2013) (“An obligation of a limited partnership
incurred while the limited partnership is a limited liability limited partnership, whether arising in
contract, tort, or otherwise, is solely the obligation of the limited partnership. A general partner is not
personally liable, directly or indirectly, by way of contribution or otherwise, for such an obligation
solely by reason of being or acting as a general partner.”).
26. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 304(a) (2006) (amended 2013) (“The debts, obligations, or other
liabilities of a limited liability company, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise: (1) are solely
the debts, obligations, or other liabilities of the company; and (2) do not become the debts, obligations,
or other liabilities of a member or manager solely by reason of the member acting as a member or
manager acting as a manager.”).
27. United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441, 448 (1973) (stating that for [the purpose of calculating
partnership income], the partnership is regarded as an independently recognizable entity apart from
the aggregate of its partners. Once its income is ascertained and reported, its existence may be
disregarded since each partner must pay tax on a portion of the total income as if the partnership were
merely an agent or conduit through which the income passed); see also WILLIAM S. MCKEE ET AL.,
FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS 1.02[3] (2d ed. 1990).
28. See generally Jeremy E. Goldstein & John Goode, Entity and Aggregate Theories of
Partnership: The Need for Clarification, 1 PROB. & PROP. 15 (1987).
29. UPA Revision Subcomm. of the Comm. on P’ships & Unincorporated Bus. Orgs., Should
the Uniform Partnership Act Be Revised?, 43 BUS. LAW. 121, 124 (1987).

504

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 40:497

of nonprofit partnerships.30 The Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit
Association Act now defines nonprofit associations as entities31 and
provides that the members of a nonprofit association have limited
liability.32
B. The Relationship Among Limited Liability, Separate
Entity Status, and Taxation
The extension of entity status to general partnerships is particularly
surprising because it was not accompanied by a change in how
partnerships are taxed. Originally, the fact that corporations were
considered a separate legal person meant that it was also easy to see
corporations as separate taxpayers.33 Partnerships, on the other hand,
which were not considered a separate entity, were not seen as a taxpayer
separate from the partners.34 The result was that partnerships were exempt
from the double taxation that applied to corporations in which the profits
of the corporation were first taxed in the hands of the corporation and then,
when a dividend of some of the remaining profits was paid to the
shareholders, the profits were taxed again as income to the shareholders.35
The system under which corporations were taxed separately was
logically consistent with the separate entity status of corporations and
meant that the corporation was compensating society in exchange for the
privileges of limited liability and separate entity status.36 The link between
limited liability, separate entity status, and separate status as a taxpayer
was severed some time ago for smaller corporations that were eligible for
taxation as “S corporations.”37 But the special s-corp status was subject to
30. ABA NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, ABA REPORT,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/intlaw/leadership/policy/Uniform_Unincorpo
rated_Nonprofit_Association_Act.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SK3-HR2V].
31. UNIF. UNINCORPORATED NONPROFIT ASS’N ACT § 5(a) (2008) (amended 2013) (“An
unincorporated nonprofit association is an entity distinct from its members and managers.”).
32. Id. § 8(a) (“A debt, obligation, or other liability of an unincorporated nonprofit association
is solely the debt, obligation, or other liability of the association. A member or manager is not
personally liable, directly or indirectly, by way of contribution or otherwise for a debt, obligation, or
other liability of the association solely by reason of being or acting as a member or manager. This
subsection applies regardless of the dissolution of the association.”).
33. See, e.g., In re Fed.-Mogul Glob. Inc., 411 B.R. 148, 164 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008) (“[T]he basic
principle of corporate law that corporations are independent legal ‘persons,’ who, like natural persons,
may sue and be sued.”); William J. Rands, Passthrough Entities and Their Unprincipled Differences
Under Federal Tax Law, 49 SMU L. REV. 15, 17–18 (1995).
34. Sole Proprietorships, Partnerships and LLCs Are Commonly Used Entities, BIZFILINGS
(Jan. 1, 2015), http://www.bizfilings.com/toolkit/sbg/tax-info/fed-taxes/sole-proprietorships-arentseparate-tax-entities.aspx [https://perma.cc/QV7N-XHL5].
35. 14A FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 6953 (2016).
36. Beam, supra note 3.
37. The History and Challenges of America’s Dominant Business Structure, S-CORP.ORG,
http://s-corp.org/our-history/ [https://perma.cc/2227-RZYW].
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restrictions38 that limited its utility and was not as beneficial to the owners
of a business as the manner in which partnerships were taxed.
The spread of limited liability and separate entity status to forms of
unincorporated business entities that are not considered separate taxpayers
means that our system of entity law no longer imposes any price on a
business in exchange for the grant of limited liability and separate entity
status. Those benefits are now conferred by the state essentially free of
charge, except for the nominal filing fees required when an entity is first
formed and when it files its annual reports with the Secretary of State or
other filing office.39
The universal availability of limited liability—with both its benefits
and limitations—raises the question whether the states—and traditional
corporations—have been shortchanged by the rise of entities that do not
pay for externalities nor foster social benefit, because they are not subject
to double taxation, and yet receive the benefits of limited liability and
separate identity. The answer, as we suggest in Part IV, is that society
would be justified in repricing the grant of limited liability and separate
entity status by requiring responsible behavior from the entities it creates.
III. IS THERE STILL MODERN RELEVANCE TO AN OLD DEBATE?
Among the many ways that people have characterized corporations
and the role of the law that governs them are the “contractarian”40 and
“concession”41 theories. The contractarian theory sees a corporation as a
contractual entity and sees corporate law as facilitating the contracting
process that creates a corporation.42 Stefan J. Padfield characterizes those
viewing corporations as a nexus of contracts as having a
laissez-faire approach to corporate regulation [because] the
corporation [is] a contract that suffers primarily, if not solely, from
agency problems in terms of maximizing utility-agency problems
that are best solved by elevating shareholder wealth maximization as
the primary directive of corporate directors and letting shareholders
and management battle it out over the terms of their contract as they
38. These restrictions include imposition of ongoing fees, confinement to one class of stock,
restriction to 100 shareholders, closer IRS scrutiny, and less flexibility in allocating income and loss.
S Corporation Advantages and Disadvantages, BIZFILINGS, http://www.bizfilings.com/learn/scorporation-advantages-and-disadvantages.aspx [https://perma.cc/VH2R-BR69].
39. See, e.g., Annual Report and Tax Instructions, STATE OF DELAWARE, https://corp.delaware.
gov/paytaxes.shtml.
40. See Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31
J. CORP. L. 799 (2016).
41. Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV. 80, 85
(1991).
42. Klausner, supra note 40, at 782.
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see fit, subject only to default rules provided by the state for those
situations where bargaining is too costly or simply overlooked.43

To the extent conducting business in the corporate form creates
negative externalities, the contractarian advocates that regulatory
responses be limited to generally applicable laws.44
Antony Page and Robert Katz posit that Corporate Social
Responsibility reflects the contractarian view and relies on “extralegal
strategies such as self-regulation, external monitoring, and consumer
activism”45 to push corporations to make decisions that are beneficial to
society and relegating government to authorizing corporate philanthropy
and consideration of nonshareholder interests.46 They characterize the
social enterprise movement as compatible with what they term the “more
libertarian” contractarian understanding of corporate law.47
The concession theory, in contrast, sees a corporation as the creation
of the state, exercising delegated authority.48 Padfield associates the
concession view with those who fear corporate power.49 This fear plays
out in a characterization of Frankenstein-like corporations whose mindless
and amoral power must be restrained. This characterization is implied in
the dissent of Justice Stevens in Citizens United, who posits that
corporations have “been effectively delegated responsibility for ensuring
society’s economic welfare,” but they “have no consciences, no feelings,
no thoughts, no desires.”50
In Padfield’s view, the regulatory response of those holding a
“concession” or progressive view of corporations will “conform corporate
law to the shifting cultural and social norms of the time.”51 This, so the
argument goes, is because the state grants a corporation its existence,
defines its attributes, and dictates the terms and conditions on which it can
persist, and thus should be entitled to guide the corporation, just as in the
early days when charters were granted so that corporations could promote
43. Stefan J. Padfield, The Dodd-Frank Corporation: More than a Nexus-of-Contracts, 114 W.
VA. L. REV. 209, 220 (2011) (internal quotations omitted).
44. Id. at 221.
45. Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Is Social Enterprise the New Corporate Social
Responsibility, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1351, 1376–77 (2011).
46. See id.
47. See id. at 1379.
48. Stefan J. Padfield, Corporate Social Responsibility & Concession Theory, 6 WM. & MARY
BUS. L. REV. 1, 20 (2015).
49. Padfield, supra note 43, at 221.
50. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 465–66 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Padfield characterizes Justice Stevens’s dissent in Citizens United as embodying
concession theory (even though Justice Stevens himself disclaimed any reliance on corporate law
theory). See Padfield, supra note 48, at 226.
51. Padfield, supra note 48, at 214.
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specific pro-social goals.52 Page and Katz similarly characterize
progressive (concession) corporate law as a way to restructure corporate
law and to alter the decision-makers.53
In actuality, however, both historically and currently, the view of
corporate law as a contract carries with it an understanding of fixed terms
and vested rights.54 As early as the Marshall Court and its decision in
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,55 the charter of a corporation
was recognized as a contract and thus subject to the protection of the
Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution.56 In other words, the
contractarian view limits the power of the State vis-à-vis the entities it
creates—a more Frankenstein vision than any view of corporate law as a
concession. As the U. S. Supreme Court explained in Beer Company v.
Massachusetts:
Whatever differences of opinion may exist as to the extent and
boundaries of the police power, and however difficult it may be to
render a satisfactory definition of it, there seems to be no doubt that
it does extend to the protection of the lives, health, and property of
the citizens, and to the preservation of good order and the public
morals. The legislature cannot, by any contract, divest itself of the
power to provide for these objects. They belong emphatically to that
class of objects which demand the application of the maxim, salus
populi suprema lex; and they are to be attained and provided for by
such appropriate means as the legislative discretion may devise. That
discretion can no more be bargained away than the power itself.57

Because the concession theory is grounded in an understanding that
the state concedes a role to corporations and other limited liability entities,
52. Id. at 217.
53. Page & Katz, supra note 45, at 1376–77.
54. See, e.g., Miller v. The State, 82 U.S. 478, 488 (1872).
Corporate franchises, granted to private corporations, if duly accepted by the corporators,
partake of the nature of legal estates, and the grant, under such circumstances, if it be
absolute in its terms, and without any condition or reservation, importing a different
intent, becomes a contract within the protection of that clause of the Constitution which
ordains that no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts. Charters of
private corporations are regarded as executed contracts between the State and the
corporators, and the rule is well settled that the legislature, if the charter does not contain
any reservation or other provision modifying or limiting the nature of the contract, cannot
repeal, impair, or alter such a charter against the consent or without the default of the
corporation, judicially ascertained and declared. Subsequent legislation, altering or
modifying such a charter, where there is no such reservation, is plainly unauthorized, if it
is prejudicial to the rights of the corporators, and was passed without their consent.
Id.
55. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819).
56. Id.
57. Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 33 (1877).

508

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 40:497

it recognizes that state law is enacted in light of its overarching obligation
to provide for its citizens—a view of both the state and limited liability
entities that allows for the evolution of both social values and entity
responses. Such a view does not require the added leap that corporations
are avaricious and otherwise amoral, the perspective apparently held by
Justice Stevens. Indeed, much of what is positive in this
country—historically and currently—is the result of corporate innovation
and productivity, and, to the extent the motivation for that has been profits
for the corporation and its investors, those profits are well-earned. The
caveat to that value, however, is that if the state is being forced to
underwrite externalities or strain the social fabric attributable to the
business (whether from environmental degradation, a refusal to employ
full-time, benefit-eligible workers, or otherwise), part of the profits
properly belong to the state and not the company or its investors.
In other words, drawing on a more benign view of concession theory,
a state can act from its respect for the value corporate flexibility can bring
rather than from a fear of corporate power, which in turn calls for
empowering procedural regulation rather than constraining substantive
regulation. As states face changing needs and mores, the entity forms
provided by the states for the organization of businesses can adapt to meet
those changes better and can more properly be asked to meet those changes
if they are seen as operating pursuant to a state concession rather than
under the contractarian view.
Justice Stevens’s perspective hearkens back to a belief that Berle
espoused: if corporate managers had a fiduciary duty to many masters,
they would be effectively unconstrained.58 Although Berle would later
revise this view somewhat, there is an intuitive sense—dating back to
scripture—that a person cannot serve multiple masters.59 But that is
precisely the problem with framing corporate responsibility in terms of
loyalty to and care for someone. Fiduciary duties presuppose that a
confidential relationship exists that permits a beneficiary to repose trust in
a trustee to place the beneficiary’s interest above all others.60
While it is true that the 1960 Act does not, like the statutes cited in
that case, expressly subject the Government to duties of management
and conservation, the fact that the property occupied by the United
States is expressly subject to a trust supports a fair inference that an
obligation to preserve the property improvements was incumbent on
58. See A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1365, 1367 (1932).
59. Matthew 6:24.
60. See Fiduciary Duty, WEX LEGAL DICTIONARY, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
fiduciary_duty [https://perma.cc/L5AR-R6A6].
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the United States as trustee. This is so because elementary trust law,
after all, confirms the commonsense assumption that a fiduciary
actually administering trust property may not allow it to fall into ruin
on his watch. One of the fundamental common-law duties of a trustee
is to preserve and maintain trust assets.61
Dominant or controlling shareholders, we held, are “fiduciar[ies]
whose powers are powers [held] in trust.” We then explained: Their
dealings with the corporation are subjected to rigorous scrutiny and
where any of their contracts or engagements with the corporation is
challenged the burden is on the director or stockholder not only to
prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show its inherent
fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested
therein. . . . The essence of the test is whether or not under all the
circumstances the transaction carries the earmarks of an arm’s length
bargain. If it does not, equity will set it aside. 62

Instead, limited liability entities should be empowered and
encouraged to recognize that there is a Venn diagram of categories of
benefits to the citizens of a state; a limited liability entity should be at least
encouraged to—and perhaps required to—choose what maximizes either
the overlap of them all or the intersection of the areas the limited liability
entity deems the most important. If, for example, a company provides
additional benefits to its employees, including, perhaps, tuition for them
and their families, the company will be providing benefits to the
community as well. The converse holds true as well: if a corporation
demonstrates a commitment to the community it inhabits, that will benefit
the employees who live there. The same can be said of a company
committed to reducing externalities, whether by buying locally, shifting to
sustainable energy sources, or sponsoring cleanup of degraded resources.
With all due respect to Justice Stevens, core corporate law theory
presupposes that corporations can and do make such choices. At the least,
a corporation is expected to (i) understand and refrain from unlawful or
tortious activity;63 (ii) understand and strategically address market input;64

61. United States v. White Mt. Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 475 (2003).
62. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 559 U.S. 335, 346–47 (2010) (quoting Pepper v. Litton, 308
U.S. 295 (1939)).
63. See INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS: CYBER LAW § 2, at 868 (Wolters Kluwer
2016) (“Tort law is a branch of the law of civil obligations, where the legal persons, both natural
persons and corporations have legal obligations to refrain from harm to another person . . . .”).
64. See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 371, 390–92 (1937) (“The main
reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price
mechanism. . . . [T]he operation of a market costs something and by forming an organization and
allowing some authority (an ‘entrepreneur’) to direct the resources, certain marketing costs are
saved.”).
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and (iii) make decisions in line with constituents’ values.65 It is now time
for society to make clear that in return for the grant of limited liability and
perpetual existence, business entities are expected to act responsibly and
sustainably.
The preceding discussion has suggested that there is a basis in both
the contractarian concession theories to require responsible behavior by
corporations. It is good that both theories support such a requirement
because the differences between the theories lose their relevance when
applied to unincorporated entities. Unincorporated entities are universally
regarded as arising primarily from the contract made by the owners of the
business to conduct business together.66 But even in the context of entities
created principally by private contract, there is a basis for the state to
expect certain norms of behavior.
IV. THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW PARADIGM
Beginning in 2010 with the enactment of the first benefit corporation
law in Maryland,67 there has been an increasing recognition that society
would benefit from authorizing businesses to conduct their operations in a
responsible and sustainable manner. There are now thirty-one jurisdictions
in the United States68 and one foreign country (Italy)69 that have authorized
corporations that have the characteristics described below. Although they
are sometimes called by different names in different states,70 we refer to
them in this discussion by the most commonly used name of “benefit
corporations.”
Benefit corporations share three main characteristics:
1. The purpose of the corporation is redefined as being “triple
bottom line,” meaning that in addition to the usual purpose of a
business corporation to be financially profitable, the corporation
also has a purpose of creating “a material positive impact on
65. See William M. Lafferty et al., A Brief Introduction to the Fiduciary Duties of Directors
Under Delaware Law, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 837, 841 (2012).
66. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Rationalizing Entity Law: Corporate Law and Alternative
Entities (Part II), BUS. L. TODAY, Dec. 2013, at 3. (“[F]reedom of contract in the LLC form should
still be able to operate in much the way that the DLLCA now provides . . . . Informed venturers with
legal capacity should be able to enter into valid and binding contracts that vary statutory or common
law duties. They may have other ways of supplying the trust needed to engage in business together.”).
67. MD. CODE ANN., Corps & Ass’ns § 5-6C-03 (West 2012).
68. Frederick H. Alexander, The Capital Markets and Benefit Corporations, BUS. L. TODAY,
July 2016.
69. ALISSA PELATAN & ROBERTO RANDAZZO, THE FIRST EUROPEAN BENEFIT CORPORATION:
BLURRING THE LINES BETWEEN “SOCIAL” AND “BUSINESS”, http://www.bwbllp.com/file/benefitcorporation-article-june-16-pdf [https://perma.cc/P5TL-VBX8].
70. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 362 (2015) (“Public Benefit Corporation”); HAW. REV.
STAT. §§ 420d-1 to 420d-13 (2011) (“Sustainable Business Corporation”).
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society and the environment, taken as a whole, form its business
and operations.”71 That statement of the expanded purpose of a
benefit corporation is taken from the Model Benefit Corporation
Legislation that has been the basis for most of the statutes
enacted by the states.72 To the same effect is the requirement in
the Delaware statute that a benefit corporation “operate in a
responsible and sustainable manner.”73
2. The duties of the directors are redefined to require them to
consider the interests of the nonfinancial stakeholders of the
corporation in addition to the interests of the shareholders.74
3. The corporation is subject to a new requirement to report on its
pursuit of its expanded purpose.75 The purpose of this
requirement is to supplement the financial statements of the
corporation so that the shareholders have a full picture of the
triple bottom line performance of the corporation and not just its
financial performance.
As noted above, Italy has joined the trend in the United States to
authorize benefit corporations.76 More broadly, there is an increasing
interest internationally in encouraging businesses to operate in a more
responsible manner.77 A notable example is the Social Impact Investment
Taskforce established under the UK’s presidency of the G8.78 That
taskforce was supported by four working groups, one of which was the
Mission Alignment Working Group.79 That working group prepared a
detailed set of recommendations for how countries could promote

71. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 102 (2016) (“general public benefit”).
72. See, e.g., The Model Legislation, BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.net/attorneys/modellegislation [https://perma.cc/U38K-TURE] (explaining Delaware passed benefit corporation
legislation in July 2013, and offering more information about the Delaware benefit corporation statute
and how it compares to the model statute).
73. DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 362(a) (2015).
74. Benefit Corporation Director Duties, BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.net/
businesses/benefit-corporation-director-duties [https://perma.cc/22E3-V3KS].
75. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 401 (2016) (“Benefit Director”).
76. PELATAN & RANDAZZO, supra note 69.
77. See Business in Society: Making a Positive and Responsible Contribution, INT’L CHAMBER
COM.,
http://www.iccwbo.org/products-and-services/trade-facilitation/9-steps-to-responsiblebusiness-conduct/ [https://perma.cc/RM4D-K3GL].
78. Social Impact Investment Taskforce, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/
groups/social-impact-investment-taskforce [https://perma.cc/29ZF-EBHU]. The Taskforce was
superseded by the Global Social Impact Investment Steering Group. Global Social Impact Investment
Steering Group, SOC. IMPACT INV., http://www.socialimpactinvestment.org [https://perma.cc/J8B9RE6E].
79. See Social Impact Investment Taskforce, supra note 78.
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businesses with a broader purpose.80 Recommendation 6 urges countries
to promote the organization of businesses with the three characteristics
described above.81 Recommendation 2 provides that those characteristics
“should be available under each of the basic legal forms that may be used
in the country to organize a business.”82 While the focus of the taskforce
was on social impact businesses, rather than business generally,
Recommendation 20 urges countries to encourage the growth and funding
of businesses that, more broadly, are seeking to create a positive impact
on society and the environment.83
The recommendation of the G8 taskforce that all forms of business
entity should be able to seek to create positive impacts on society and the
environment84 is already being implemented in the United States. There is
the start of a movement to extend the benefit corporation form beyond
corporations to unincorporated entities. Maryland, Oregon, and
Pennsylvania have authorized the creation of limited liability companies,
called “benefit companies,” which mimic the benefit corporation form and
have the three characteristics described above.85
It is customary to refer to Milton Friedman and his classic article
“The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits”86 for the
proposition that a business should be focused solely on maximizing its
financial performance for the benefit of its owners. But in that article,
Friedman makes the following comment:
In a free-enterprise, private-property system, a corporate executive is
an employee of the owners of the business. He has direct
responsibility to his employers. That responsibility is to conduct the
business in accordance with their desires, which generally will be to
make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules
of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in
ethical custom.87

Thus, even in Friedman’s view, there is room for society’s ethical
customs to influence how business is to be conducted.
80. See SOC. IMPACT INV. TASKFORCE, MISSION ALIGNMENT WORKING GRP, PROFIT-WITHPURPOSE BUSINESSES (2014), http://www.socialimpactinvestment.org/reports/Mission%20
Alignment%20WG%20paper%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TNR-4FSW] [hereinafter MISSION
ALIGNMENT PAPER].
81. See id. at 21.
82. See id. at 19–20.
83. See id. at 28–29.
84. See id. at 23–24.
85. See, e.g., Maryland Proposes the Benefit LLC, CHANGEMATTERS (Mar. 14, 2011),
http://changematters.com/2011/03/benefit-llc/.
86. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 13, 1970 (Magazine).
87. Id. (emphasis added).
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United States entity law has developed to a state in which all business
entities have available to them limited liability that accompanies separate
existence as a legal entity. But most entities are now not obligated to pay
for their externalities and are not expected to prioritize or address the needs
of the larger community as part of a social bargain for entity privileges.
We propose that such a bargain is a fair and necessary one. Entities should
be expected to engage in responsible and sustainable behavior as the price
for limited liability and separate entity status. And benefit corporations
demonstrate the viability of such an expectation.

